Sustaining Economic Peace: When Do Sanctions Recur?

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Abstract

When do economic sanctions recur? Do senders renew sanctions episodes to punish targets' pursuit of offensive behavior in the aftermath of sanctions removal or is the recurrence decision mainly influenced by the domestic considerations of the leaders of the sender country? I argue that sanctions removal and the subsequent provision of sanctions relief strengthen targets' economies and incentivize them to pursue foreign policy challenges. However, I demonstrate that sanctions recurrence is not always a reaction to the policies adopted by the target in the post-sanctions period, but is primarily driven by domestic considerations of senders. Using empirical analysis, I find that sanctions are more likely to recur if the leader changes in the sender country in the aftermath of sanctions removal and a different domestic coalition becomes influential.

On October 13, 2017, President Trump announced his decision to de-certify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear deal between the P5+1[1] and Iran, in which the Iranian government agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. He stated that the nuclear deal and the subsequent sanctions relief allow Iran to sprint towards a rapid nuclear weapons breakout, and give the regime an immediate financial boost that is used to fund terrorism and escalate the regime's dangerous aggression.[2] In addition to the threat of new nuclear sanctions, he also announced the imposition of new terrorism related sanctions on Iran, by targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This raises the question: why is President Trump re-considering his predecessor's decision to end economic sanctions on Iran? In this paper, I generalize this question and identify the conditions under which senders initiate new sanctions episodes in the period after the end of initial sanctions.

One explanation can be the concerns about the target's behavior in the post-sanctions period. Senders can initiate new sanctions if the target channels the gains from sanctions relief into the policy that initially triggered sanctions, or into another policy that is offensive to the sender. President Trump might be concerned about the Iranian compliance with the nuclear deal. Despite the reports published by the International Atomic Energy Agency attesting to the Iranian compliance,[3] he has stated in numerous occasions that "Iran has committed multiple violations of the agreement." Similarly, he might be concerned about the implications of a stronger Iran and the regime's future foreign policy choices.

Alternatively, senders' decision to initiate new sanctions can be influenced by their domestic considerations, instead of being a reaction to the target's behavior. For instance, President Trump might be expecting political gains from reviving the Iranian sanctions debate. Withdrawing from the nuclear accord was one his main foreign policy campaign

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[1]5 permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, U.K., U.S.) and Germany.

[2]United States, Office of the Press Secretary."Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy." *The White House*, 13 October 2017, Retrieved from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/10/13/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy

[3]"IAEA confirms Iran is meeting its commitments under nuclear agreement" (2017, November 13), *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iaea-confirms-iran-is-meeting-its-commitments-under-nuclear-deal/2017/11/13/8d9b9fb0-c893-11e7-b0cf-7689a9f2d84e_story.html?utm_term=.897abcec489a

promises and he has frequently criticized President Obama and his administration for signing "*one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.*" Renewing sanctions on Iran can potentially receive the support of the Republicans and the special interest groups that initially opposed the nuclear deal. According to the Pew Research Center's polling conducted in mid-July 2015, shortly after President Obama announced the deal, only 6% of Republican respondents indicated support for the deal and 75% of Republican respondents indicated that the ability of the U.S. and international agencies to monitor Iran's compliance is either "not too much" or "none at all".[4] Therefore, President Trump's decision to renew sanctions on Iran can appeal to his political base.

Do economic sanctions recur in response to targets' pursuit of offensive behavior in the aftermath of sanctions removal or is the recurrence decision mainly influenced by the domestic considerations of the leaders of the sender country? Using empirical analysis, I demonstrate that targets' behavior in the post-sanctions period is not a significant determinant of whether sanctions recur. Instead, sanctions are more likely to recur if the leader changes in the sender country and a different societal coalition becomes influential. I argue that the leaders that end sanctions remain to be constrained by the preferences of the same societal base and interest groups that initially influenced the termination decision. They may also be worried about signaling foreign policy inconsistency and admitting that the termination decision was a mistake. New leaders, however, do not have the same constraints, especially if they represent a different societal base. On the contrary, sanctions recurrence can provide them with opportunities for political gain.

Analyzing the Aftermath of Sanctions Removal

The research on economic sanctions has extensively focused on two main questions. When do countries choose to use economic coercion to achieve their foreign policy goals (Lektzian and Souva 2003; Smith 1996)? When do these coercive efforts succeed in achieving their

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[4]For the full report, see: http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2015/09/09-8-2015-Iran-release.pdf

intended goals (Dizaji and Bergeijk 2013; Bapat and Morgan 2009; Peksen and Peterson 2015; Allen 2005; Cortright and Lopez 2002; Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff 2007; Early 2015; McLean and Whang 2010)? Scholars have also devoted significant attention to the possible unintended consequences of economic sanctions (Wood 2008; Peksen 2009; Peksen and Drury 2010; McLean et al. 2016), sanctions-busting (Early 2015), and sanctions' impact on conflict dynamics (Hultman and Peksen 2017; Lektzian and Regan 2016). Despite the growing body of literature on economic sanctions, our understanding on the sanctioning process is limited to the time period in which sanctions are in place and the scholarly interest in economic sanctions often dissipates with their termination. However, sanctions-level characteristics continue to influence sender-target relations in the post-sanctions period, and the aftermath of sanctions removal can be conceptualized as an integral part of the whole sanctioning process. Every renewed sanctions episode is an instance of sanctions onset; however, I argue that the process that generates the initial sanctions is distinct from the process that generates subsequent rounds of sanctions, because the removal decision itself changes the environment in which senders and targets interact. Therefore, this requires the examination of the underlying causal mechanisms that lead to new sanctions, instead of treating each new sanctions as independent instances of sanctions onset.

In this paper, I analyze the period after the end of economic sanctions and identify when senders and targets relapse into a renewed sanctions episode. I formulate two competing theories of sanctions recurrence. First, I explore a theory that views sanctions recurrence as a continuation of the bargaining between the sender and the target and assumes strategic interaction between players. Second, I propose a theory that focuses on senders' domestic considerations. Testing these two competing theories allows me to investigate whether sanctions recurrence is a reaction to the policies adopted by the target in the post-sanctions period or whether it is an outcome shaped by the sender's domestic calculations. Before presenting the two theories, I first examine the environment that sanctions removal creates and how this environment shapes the sender-target relations in the post-sanctions period.

Sanctions Relief and Commitment Problems

Economic sanctions harm the target country's economy, either directly by freezing or limiting economic and financial transactions, or indirectly by creating market imperfections through fines on individuals and businesses, travel bans or increased uncertainty about the economic stability of the targeted country. Theoretically, the accumulation of these direct and indirect costs are expected to inhibit the target's ability to pursue its offensive behavior (Dorussen and Mo 2001) and force the target to make policy concessions (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi 2014). Removing sanctions, on the other hand, resumes profitable economic and financial transactions and reverses the market imperfections, thereby strengthening the target's economy. Sanctions termination and the subsequent provision of sanctions relief often generate substantial economic gains for the targeted country in the form of increased trade revenues, repatriation of assets frozen abroad, the ease of financial transactions, and an increased flow of investment or foreign aid.

Targets' access to sanctions relief can have two important implications for the sender-target relations in the post-sanctions period. First, a stronger economy will contribute to the target's future bargaining power (Fearon 1996; Chadefaux 2011; McCormack and Pascoe 2015) and makes the target more resilient to economic pressure. If the sender chooses to use economic sanctions as a coercive strategy in the future, it will now be facing a wealthier target with a stronger negotiating position, and a target that has a higher capability of offsetting the costs of new sanctions. In other words, sanctions removal might hinder the effectiveness of the next round of sanctions. Second, having a stronger economy might create incentives for the target to channel the gains obtained through sanctions relief into its foreign policy challenges that initially triggered sanctions, or adopt new policies that might be offensive to the sender. Sanctions relief can provide the target with opportunities to challenge the status quo in the post-sanctions period. As the target state gets wealthier with sanctions relief, it may not be able to credibly commit not to take advantage of sanctions removal and exploit the greater bargaining leverage it has (Powell 2004, 2006). Commitment problems can be

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more acute in cases where sanctions removal deals are difficult to enforce and the target's behavior in the post-sanctions period is hard to detect (Fearon 1998; Schultz 2010). In sum, once senders end economic sanctions, they might lose leverage over the target and it's policy choices.

Senders can threaten targets with new economic sanctions or put sanctions back on if the target is found to be in pursuit of an offensive behavior in the post-sanctions behavior. In this paper, I test this expectation against an alternative explanation based on the sender's domestic politics. Do senders renew sanctions episodes in response to target's offensive behavior, or is the recurrence decision mainly influenced by the domestic considerations of the leadership of the sender country? In the following sections, I expand on both explanations and formulate two competing hypothesis about when sanctions recur.

A Bargaining Theory of Sanctions Recurrence

A considerable amount of literature on economic sanctions has relied on the bargaining framework by conceptualizing sanctions episodes as instances of strategic interaction between senders and targets (Drezner 1999; Lacy and Niou 2004; Krustev 2010; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Bapat and Kwon 2015; Cortright and Lopez 2002). The research presented in these studies often defines economic sanctions as a coercive foreign policy tool designed to induce a targeted country to change some of its policies it would not otherwise, in a way favorable to the sender (Baldwin 1985; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Morgan, Bapat and Krustev 2009). In theory, sanctions achieve this by imposing economic costs on the targeted country, and demanding policy change in exchange for sanctions relief. The promise of resuming profitable economic interactions or reversing market imperfections are expected to serve as a credible bargaining leverage for senders to induce target cooperation. The implicit assumption made by all of these studies is that the driver of the sender's decision is the target's behavior and the goal of the sanctioning behavior is to convince the target to make policy concessions. Economic sanctions aim to affect the target's cost/benefit analysis and alter its

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assessment about the feasibility of its offensive behavior by increasing the costs of it.

In order to apply the insights of the bargaining framework to a theory of sanctions recurrence, I assume that the primary motivator of the sender's actions is the target's behavior and the primary goal of the sender's sanctioning behavior is to convince the target to alter its behavior. Therefore, we should observe threats or imposition of economic sanctions in the aftermath of sanctions removal if the target is engaging in an offensive behavior.

Once sanctions are removed, there is often an implicit expectation that sanctions will be renewed in case of a non-compliance in the post-sanctions period. Targets' non-compliance can either be in the form of recidivism, pursuing the offensive behavior that initially triggered sanctions, or in the form pursuing a new offensive behavior using the gains from sanctions relief. Either way, senders are expected to call on this behavior by threatening them with new sanctions, or punish them with potentially harsher sanctions. This is especially true if the initial sanctions ended with partial or full target capitulation or a negotiated settlement. If the sender fails to punish the target's offensive behavior in the post-sanctions period, this can have negative implications on the credibility of the sender in future sanctions removal negotiations. Sender's reaction to the target's behavior in the post-sanctions period allows targets to differentiate between resolved and unresolved senders. Therefore, senders always have an incentive to monitor the target's behavior in the aftermath of sanctions removal and enforce sanctions removal deals. In sum, assuming that the causal mechanisms for sanctions onset identified by the literature using the bargaining framework is applicable to the context of sanctions recurrence, I formulate the following hypothesis:

H1 - The Bargaining Theory of Sanctions Recurrence: *Senders are more likely to initiate new sanctions episodes if the target engages in an offensive behavior in the aftermath of sanctions removal.*

A Domestic Theory of Sanctions Recurrence

Even though the bargaining theory of sanctions recurrence is intuitive; the assumptions that led to its formulation have shortcomings that need to be addressed. First, the bargaining theory of sanctions recurrence analyzes the strategic interaction between the sender and the target, assuming that the actors are unitary.[5] However, an alternative theory of sanctions recurrence should consider the role of domestic actors that also get affected by, and therefore influence, the decisions to initiate, end and renew sanctions. Policymakers are often constrained by domestic actors and institutions when making foreign policy decisions, and sanctions policies are no exception. Leaders are driven by the desire to remain in office or in power and they have incentives to earn or increase the support of their winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Huth 1996). To this end, they have incentives to pursue policies, including foreign policies, that are in the best interest of the particular societal coalition that keeps them in power.

Second, the bargaining theory of sanctions recurrence assumes that the goal of renewing sanctions episodes is to punish the target's pursuit of offensive behavior and to alter its policies. As Krustev and Morgan (2011) put it, "the sender finds sanctions useful only for their potential impact on the target's policies." However, altering the target's behavior may not be the only objective of senders when they formulate policies regarding onset, removal, or recurrence. They also have domestic objectives, such increasing domestic support, appealing to certain special interest groups, thwarting internal criticism, or signaling strength and decisiveness. In these cases, sanctions can have utility even if they do not alter the target's behavior (Lindsay 1986). Therefore, when leaders are considering to end or renew sanctions, they do not only weigh the impact of their decisions on the target's policy choices, but also have domestic considerations.

There is a growing body of literature that has relaxed the unitary state assumption and

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[5]The bargaining literature on economic sanctions has some exceptions, such as Morgan and Bapat (2003)'s game theoretic model that studies the strategic interaction between sender governments and their domestic firms.

begun examining the role of domestic politics in sanctions episodes. Scholars have identified how sanctions imposition might serve as a low-cost way of displaying strong leadership during international crisis and increasing domestic support, even if sanctions do not achieve their intended goals (Whang 2011; McLean and Whang 2014). Moreover, the public choice approach and the rent-seeking literature establish that the effect of economic sanctions are likely to be felt disproportionally across domestic groups (Eyler 2007; Lektzian and Patterson 2015; Pond 2017). Economic sanctions create winners and losers in the domestic economy, and divide special interest groups and voters along the pro-sanctions/anti-sanctions line (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992). For instance, halting trade with a target country might work the way protectionism does, and create rents for domestic producers by raising the prices of importable goods above the world price (Dorussen and Mo 2001). Special interests groups that enjoys net benefits from sanctions might pressure the government for the continuation of economic sanctions. Similarly, special interest groups that experience economic losses are expected to pressure the policymakers to end sanctions.

The decision to end sanctions is made under the pressure of these competing societal demands. The literature establishes that leadership change and domestic restructuring can trigger sanctions removal because of the change in the domestic groups that are influential in foreign policy decisions (McGillivray and Stam 2004; Dorussen and Mo 2001; Krustev and Morgan 2011). Domestic restructuring refers to the changes in the composition of the politically relevant segments of the society whose support a regime needs to govern. In the case of a domestic restructuring, the new leadership might choose to end sanctions to appeal to the losers of the sanctions regime, and reversing the costs they incurred under sanctions.

There is a rich literature that establishes the link between domestic restructuring and various foreign policy outcomes such as changes in UN General Assembly voting behavior (Smith 2016; Mattes and Carroll 2015), troop withdrawal (Pilster and Tago 2015; Gelpi and Grieco 2001), initiation of WTO disputes (Bobick and Smith 2013), and alliance commitments (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004). A similar linkage is expected to manifest itself for

the decision to re-initiate sanctions. When a new leader takes power in the post-sanctions period, she can aim to reverse the sanctions removal decision in order to satisfy the special interest groups that she relies upon. If the societal/political support base of the new leader is different than its predecessor, reversing the decision to end sanctions can also be seen as an effort to appeal to its own base and the special interest groups she represents.

Leaders are not only constrained by special interests groups, but also by public opinion at large. Leaders view approval as an asset and disapproval as a political cost (Edwards 1997). Therefore, when they make decisions about when to end sanctions and when to initiate new sanctions, they account for the potential reaction of the public to this decision. If the leader initiates new sanctions against the target in the post-sanctions period, she inevitably signals foreign policy inconsistency and admits that the initial decision to end sanctions was a mistake. The public often perceives foreign policy inconsistency as evidence of incompetence (Tomz 2007). Such signals can trigger disapproval, even by those who originally opposed sanctions removal (Hermann 1990). Therefore, senders might choose not to re-initiate sanctions in the aftermath of sanctions removal, even if the target pursues an offensive behavior. In these cases, avoiding blame and ensuring foreign policy consistency can be prioritized by the leader over taking a chance at altering the target's offensive behavior.

The public's evaluation of foreign policy is an integral part of their overall performance assessment of their leaders (Nincic and Hinckley 1991). It has been suggested that for this link to exist, the public needs to be informed about foreign policy. Special interest groups do have a strong incentive to pay attention to sanctions policies and its distributional effects. And in the case of the larger public, Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida (1989), and more recently, Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) show that even if the public lacks information, they can still rely on their predispositions and principles in forming attitudes towards specific foreign policy issues. A common attitude Tomz (2007) identifies is a dislike for inconsistency. Even if the public may not be informed about the details of the sanctioning decisions, they will consider inconsistency as a sign of weakness. Therefore, this creates incentives for leaders to factor

"foreign policy consistency" into their sanctions recurrence decisions.

However, leaders who did not invest their own political capital to the decision to end sanctions can easily overcome these challenges. This is especially true if the new leader represents a new societal base, whose preferences are different from the domestic groups that initially supported sanctions removal. Moreover, new leaders do not only isolate themselves from the potential domestic costs of sanctions recurrence that their predecessors would face, but also expect to gain domestic benefits from sanctions recurrence. Imposing new sanctions, or reviving the sanctions debate against the target can help new leaders to differentiate themselves, and their foreign policies, from their predecessors' (Hermann 1990). More importantly, they can appeal to and bolster the support of their own base and the special interest groups that will benefit from new sanctions. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

*H2(a) - **The Domestic Theory of Sanctions Recurrence:** Senders are more likely to initiate new sanctions episodes against targets if senders' domestic sources of leader support change.*

Senders' domestic considerations are not only limited to the special interest groups and public opinion. Economic activity and macro-economic indicators are also important determinants of a leader's survival (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992). Therefore, leaders have to weigh the impact of a potential sanctions recurrence on the economy at large. Imposing new sanctions on the target disrupts the newly adjusting trade and economic activity. Similarly, new sanction threats introduce uncertainty about the economic opportunities in the target country. Once sanctions are lifted, and it becomes legal to invest in or conduct business with previously targeted countries, and once the relationship between the sender and the target starts normalizing, new lucrative economic opportunities arise for senders and their companies. Therefore, the stakes of any decision that could result in new economic restrictions on the target country are high.

These economic considerations might explain why President Trump and his European

allies differ on the future of the relations with Iran. Since the removal of the Iranian sanctions, EU imports from Iran increased by 345% and EU exports to Iran increased by 28%.[6] Moreover, several EU companies have already invested a significant amount of money in Iran, especially in the manufacturing, energy, and auto sectors. These increased economic interactions between Iran and major European economies might be one the reasons why the EU is fully standing behind the nuclear deal. The U.K., France and Germany quickly issued a joint statement on the same day of President Trump's "de-certificaiton speech", and condemned President Trump's decision to disavow the Iran nuclear deal. The recovery of economic activity between the U.S. and Iran does not match the levels of economic rapprochement between the EU and Iran; therefore, the U.S. is not necessarily constrained by economic considerations to the extent that its European allies are.

This discussion leads to a second theoretical expectation about how domestic considerations of senders influence the likelihood of sanctions recurrence:

H2(b) - The Domestic Theory of Sanctions Recurrence: Senders are less likely to initiate new sanctions episodes against targets as their trade volume with the target increases in the post-sanctions period.

Data and Research Design

Why do sanctions recur? Do senders renew sanctions in response to target's policy choices in the aftermath of sanctions removal, or are senders influenced by their domestic considerations? To test these two competing hypotheses and determine which factors influence senders' decision to re-initiate economic sanctions and which do not, I primarily use sanctions data from the Threats and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi 2014). TIES Dataset contains information on sanctions episodes initiated between 1945 and 2005 and each episode's start and end dates, along with many other sanctions-level characteristics. I create a time-series cross-sectional dataset where sanctions

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[6]Information retrieved from the European Commission's country report on Iran: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/iran/

episodes enter into the dataset once they have been lifted. When a sanctions episode ends, the sender-target dyad enters an economic peace spell during which it is at risk of relapsing into a renewed sanctions episode. To capture this economic peace spell, I create 10 post-sanctions years for each episode and identify whether sanctions recur or not in the aftermath of sanctions removal. I observe dyads until a new sanctions episode is initiated by the sender against the same target or until the end of the tenth post-sanctions year, in which case the dyad is right-censored. The unit of analysis is dyad-year for the aftermath of each security related sanctions episode and the dataset covers the years between 1947-2012.[7]

As an illustration of how I create the dataset, a closer look at a few sanctions episodes can be helpful. For instance, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Pakistan in 1965 to contain Pakistan's military aggression in the region. Sanctions were lifted in 1975, and the US-Pakistan dyad enters into the dataset in the year 1976. The U.S. initiates a new sanctions episode against Pakistan to destabilize the regime and improve its human rights in 1977; therefore, US-Pakistan dyad is observed for the years of 1976 and 1977. To look at the right-censored dyads, let me examine US-Poland sanctions. The U.S. imposed sanctions on Poland in 1980. Sanctions were lifted in 1984, and the US-Poland dyad enters into the dataset for the years between 1985 and 1994, as there were no recorded sanctions episode initiated by the U.S. against Poland in the 10-year period after the termination of initial sanctions.

If the initial sanctions episode has multiple senders, or was initiated by an international organization, I maintain the dyadic structure of the data, where the first country is the "primary sender" and the second country is the target state. TIES Dataset codes a "primary sender" as the state that proposes sanctions or is responsible for mobilizing other states to initiate sanctions. For instance, the U.S.-Poland case referenced above was initiated primarily by the United States in partnership with France, the United Kingdom, Belgium

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[7]The datasets starts in 1947, because the earliest sanctions removal date recored by the TIES dataset is 1946. The latest end year recorded is 2011, and for those cases, the hypothetical 10-year window goes until 2021. The latest post-sanctions year covered is 2012, due to availability of data for independent variables.

and Germany; however, TIES dataset identifies the "primary sender" as the United States. Therefore, I observe the aftermath of sanctions for the US-Poland dyad.

Lastly, I only analyze the aftermath of security-related sanctions[8] for two reasons: First, trade-related sanctions are imposed due to the target's trade practices or economic policies and tend to be less severe. They often target a specific economic sector and do not harm the target's economy as a whole (Peksen and Peterson 2015; Drezner 2003). Therefore, their removal do not create the same degree of commitment problems as security-related sanctions. Similarly, sanctions relief is typically enjoyed by the specific sector that was initially targeted, not by the target government. Second, trade-related sanctions are often initiated by bureaucratic branches, such as the Treasury/Commerce departments or agencies like the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the United States. Sanctions decisions made by these agencies do not frequently receive public attention or media coverage. On the contrary, security-related sanctions tend to have a higher visibility and generate significant public awareness, which in return constrains the leadership of the sender (Baum and Potter 2008).

In creating my dataset, I also account for sanctions episodes with no recorded end dates in the TIES Dataset. There are 26 such cases in my dataset and dropping them out of the analysis would result in a loss of valuable information.[9] Therefore, I use the information on the year of the last reported incident provided by TIES. The variable named *ongoing as of year* identifies the last year in which the data collectors were able to obtain information on the case and no further information about the case was found. I treat the year after the *ongoing as of year* as the end year and construct post-sanction years for the years following that end date. For instance, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Ireland in 1952 due to Ireland's alignment choices and the TIES dataset records the *ongoing as of year* as 1986. Assuming that the episode was still ongoing in 2012 will be misleading. Therefore, I code the end-

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[8]Containing political influence and military behavior, destabilizing regimes, demanding the release of citizens or property, solving territorial disputes, denying strategic material, retaliating for alliance choices, demanding human rights improvements, ending weapons proliferation, terminating support of non-state actors and punishing drug trafficking are considered as security-related goals.

[9]I also estimate the main model by dropping those 26 cases. The results remain the same and they are presented in the appendix.

year of the episode as 1987 and include observations for the U.S.-Ireland dyad for the years between 1988 and 1997.

Overall, the final dataset consists of 2722 observations, accounting for post-sanctions years of 358 unique security-related economic sanctions imposed between 1945 and 2005 and the observations cover the years between 1947 and 2012.

Dependent Variables

This paper aims to identify the conditions under which sanctions recur. Therefore, I coded *Sanctions Recurrence* as a binary variable capturing the onset of a new sanctions episode involving the same sender and the target. A new episode can be initiated either by a threat or an imposition of economic sanctions. Treating threats as instances of sanctions recurrence is in line with the causal mechanisms of the two competing theories I test. The bargaining theory establishes the importance of sanction threats and shows that effective sanctions are the ones that convince the target to alter its policy at the threat stage (Smith 1996; Lacy and Niou 2004). If senders want to alter the target's behavior in the post-sanctions period, threats can be a cost-effective coercive policy. Moreover, threats can be instrumental for domestic purposes even if it is not followed through.

I also allow the issue under contention for the renewed sanctions to be different than the issue under contention for the initial sanctions. Once sanctions are lifted and the target starts enjoying the gains from sanctions relief, it will have the opportunity and resources to pursue an offensive behavior that may not necessarily be the same as the behavior that led to sanctions initially. For instance, the U.S. imposed new sanctions on Iran on October 2017 due to Iran's support for terrorism and the new sanctions can still be conceptualized as a continuation of the nuclear-related sanctions that ended in 2016. In fact, in some cases, targets can be incentivized not to pursue the offensive behavior that initially triggered sanctions due to increased scrutiny over that behavior, especially in the short-run. However, they may choose to pursue a different offensive behavior in the hopes that they will get away

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with it.

The TIES dataset codes instances of threats and imposition of economic sanctions between the years 1945-2005. Therefore, I cannot use the TIES Dataset to identify sanctions recurrence for the years after 2005. For that reason, I gather new data on sanction threats and impositions between the years 2005 and 2012. To collect this information, I primarily consult *Lexis Nexis*, a database of electronic news drawn from the archives of over 10,000 press agencies and newspapers. I also consult government reports, United Nations resolutions, European Union documentation, and the GIGA Sanctions Dataset that codes sanctions imposed by the UN, US and EU in the period from 1990 to 2010 (Portela and von Soest 2012). In identifying threats and impositions, I strictly follow the coding rules of the TIES dataset to ensure consistency.[10]

Sanctions Recurrence is coded as 0 for each year of economic peace in the post-sanctions period and 1 on the first year of renewed economic sanctions. Once a sanctions recurrence is observed, I stop observing the aftermath of the episode in consideration. Since the outcome variable is binary, I use logistic regression. I also use robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the target state to take potential dependence among targets into account.

Of the 358 unique security-related sanctions imposed between 1945 and 2005, 133 of them recurred, accounting for 37% of the cases. I also coded the issue(s) under contention for the new sanctions episode and whether it is the same as the initial episode or not. Interestingly, the majority of new sanctions episodes are triggered by a different offensive behavior than the one triggered the initial sanctions. Only 35 of those 133 instances of recurrence are due to the same issue that initially triggered sanctions.

Independent Variables

Hypothesis 1, the bargaining theory of sanctions recurrence, suggests that senders are more likely to initiate new sanctions episodes in response to their target's pursuit of offensive behavior in the post-sanctions period. To test this hypothesis, I need a measure of whether the

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[10]A list of the newly coded episodes and their short summaries can be found in the appendix.

target pursues an offensive behavior in the aftermath of sanctions removal. What constitutes an offensive behavior differs for senders. Therefore, I identify several high-stake foreign policy challenges that are widely accepted to be offensive and code the *Bad Behavior* variable compiling information from multiple data sources. First, I code whether the target is recorded as a trigger state in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Dataset (Brecher et al. 2017). The ICB Dataset provides information on interstate military-security crisis and covers the entire temporal scope of my sample. If the target state is recorded as a trigger/initiator of a military-security crisis in a given post-sanctions year, I code *Bad Behavior* as 1. Second, I use information from Militarized Interstate Disputes (v4.1) Dataset (Palmer et al. 2015) that codes cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards another state. I code *Bad Behavior* as 1 if the target state initiates a militarized interstate dispute in the aftermath of sanctions removal. Third, Militarized Compellent Threat Dataset (Sechser 2011) records instances of an explicit demand by one state that another state alters the status quo in some material way, backed by a threat of military force if the state does not comply. If the target country is coded a challenger in the MCT Dataset in a given year in the post-sanctions period, I code *Bad Behavior* as 1. Lastly, I code the variable as 1 if the target engages in one-sided violence, the use of armed force against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths (Eck and Hultman 2007; Allansson, Melander and Themner 2017).

As an alternative explanation, the domestic theory of sanctions recurrence suggests that new sanctions episodes are not always initiated as a reaction to the target's pursuit of an offensive behavior in the post-sanctions period, but instead, the decision is primarily shaped by the sender's domestic calculations. According to Hypothesis 2(a), sanctions are more likely to recur if senders' domestic sources of leader support change in the aftermath of sanctions removal. New leaders that represent different groups with distinct interests and preferences over foreign policy are more likely to consider renewing sanctions. These new leaders are less likely to face the costs of signaling inconsistency, and on the contrary, they

can expect domestic benefits from sanction recurrence.

To test this hypothesis, I create a binary variable measuring whether a sender country bring to power a new leader whose primary support is drawn from different societal groups than those who supported her predecessor, using the Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) Dataset (Mattes, Leeds and Matsumura 2016). The variable captures the instances of leader changes that is also associated with a *change in source of leader support*, cases in which the subset of societal groups whose support allows the leader to retain power differs between the new leader and her predecessor. In coding the variable, I first identified who the leader was and what her political affiliation was at the time of sanctions removal, and code whether the leader of the country in a given post-sanctions year belong to the same societal support base or not. I code the *Change in Source of Leader Support* variable as 0 for the years in which the same leader who ended sanctions or a different leader with the same political affiliation is in power. The variable is coded as 1 only if the sender country is ruled by a new leader that receives its support from a different societal base than her predecessor who ended sanctions.

For example, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Romania in 1950 and lifted them in 1960 when Republican President Eisenhower was in power. The case enters into the dataset with the termination of sanctions and I observe the dyad from 1961 until the end of 1970, the tenth post-sanctions year. The *Change in Source of Leader Support* variable is coded as 1 for the years between 1961 and 1968, since the U.S. had two Democratic presidents in that period, President Kennedy and President Johnson, and their source of domestic support was different than Eisenhower's. The variable is coded as 0 in the year of 1969, since President Nixon, a Republican politician, took office and his support base was the same as Eisenhower's.

For the cases where the leadership in the sender country changes in the same year as sanctions termination, I examine the exact date of sanctions removal and leadership change to accurately code the variable. For instance, the U.S. ends sanctions on Nicaragua in 1993 and President Clinton takes office in the same year, following President Bush. Before coding

the *Change in Source of Leader Support*, I first identified that the sanctions were terminated on April 1993, 3 months after Clinton took office. Therefore, I code whether the U.S. has a new leader with a new political support base in the post-sanctions period, using Democratic President Clinton as the comparison point.

Lastly, I argue that leaders consider macro-economic indicators when deciding whether to renew sanctions against targets. Hypothesis 2(b) suggests that sanctions recurrence is less likely if the the trade volume between the sender and the target increases in the post-sanctions period. Sanctions recurrence becomes costlier for the sender as its trade grows with the target. Therefore, increasing economic connectedness might shield the target country from new sanctions in the post-sanctions period. To capture this dynamic, I create *Growth of S's Trade with the Target* variable. I first compute the sum of the sender's exports to and imports from the target at the year of the termination of initial sanctions and measure how much it grows or shrinks in any given post-sanctions year, using Barbieri and Keshk (2012).

Control Variables

Additionally, I control for other factors that can predict the likelihood of sanctions recurrence. First, I include a measure of *Foreign Policy Affinity*, using data assembled from UN General Assembly votes (Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey 2009). The dataset provides a score of foreign policy similarity within dyads ranging from -1 (least similar) to 1 (most similar). In line with the literature on sanctions onset, I expect this variable to be inversely related to the likelihood of sanctions removal. Second, I control for the relative strength of the sender to the target, using the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) (Singer 1987).

In addition, I control for three characteristics of the initial sanctions. First, I account for how initial sanctions ended. I code *Target Acquiescence* as 1 if the initial sanctions ended with the target's partial or full concessions, or a negotiated settlement, and 0 if the sanctions ended with sender capitulation. If the initial sanctions ended with target concessions, non-compliance in the post-sanctions period can be more likely to be punished than a case where

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the episode ended with sender capitulation.[11] Second, I code *Multilateral* as 0 if the initial episode was unilateral, and as 1 if it was initiated through an international organization or had multiple senders. Since attracting the same level of support for new sanctions is often challenging, I expect to find that multilateral sanctions are less likely to recur. I also control for whether the initial sanctions had one or more issues under contention. *Multiple Issues* variable is coded as 0 if TIES data codes just a single security-related issue as the trigger of sanctions, and 1 if there were more than one issues under contention.

There are many sender-target dyads with more than one peace spell in the data set. Treating these observations independent could possibly bias coefficient estimates. Therefore, I generate a count variable named *Frequency of the Dyad* that counts the number of times the sender-target dyad appears in the dataset up until the time an episode enters into the dataset. The variable accounts for the history of economic conflict between the sender and the target and higher frequency of sanctioning activity can predict future economic conflict. Lastly, I control for the temporal dependency by using cubic polynomial approximation (Carter and Signorino 2010). I first add the *Count of Post-Sanctions Years*, a duration variable measuring the length of post-sanctions economic peace spell. The variable is coded as 1 for the first post-sanctions year of a given sanctions episode, 2 for its second year, 3 for its third year, and 10 for its tenth year. I also add its squared and cubed terms as regressors.

Results

Table 1 presents the results of a logistic regression with *Sanctions Recurrence* as the dependent variable. Each model tests the effect of independent and control variables discussed above on the likelihood of senders' initiating a new sanctions episode against targets in any given year after the end of the initial sanctions. Model 1 uses the full sample of post-sanction years of each security-related sanctions episode. Model 2 restricts the sample to cases where the sender of the initial episode was a democratic state. The justification for this restriction

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[11]As an additional robustness check, I also restricted the sample to the set of cases where *Target Acquiescence* is coded as 1.

is two-fold: First, the operationalization of *Bad Behavior* can argued to be from a democratic sender's perspective. Second, the domestic theory of sanctions recurrence might be more applicable to democratic senders, as the link between public opinion and foreign policy decision making is stronger in democracies (Risse-Kappen 1991). Model 3 restricts the sample to the cases where the target is engaging in an offensive behavior in the aftermath of the removal of initial sanctions. This model captures the likelihood of the sender to respond to the target's pursuit of an offensive behavior with new sanctions.

Table 1: Logistic Regression: Sanctions Recurrence

DV: Initiating a New Sanctions Episode	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Bad Behavior	0.302	0.479	
	(0.28)	(0.28)	
Change in Source of Leader Support	0.580*	0.589*	0.995**
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.34)
Growth of S's Trade with T	-0.475**	-0.515**	-0.207
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)
Foreign Policy Affinity	-0.712**	-0.730***	-0.641*
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.28)
Frequency of the Dyad	0.323***	0.327***	0.292***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Multilateral	0.572*	0.521*	0.401
	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.34)
Multiple Issues	-0.409	-0.623*	-0.806*
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.38)
Relative CINC Scores	-0.000*	-0.000	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Target Acquiescence	0.268	0.275	0.024
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.29)
Count of Post-Sanctions Years	-0.211***	-0.180**	-0.227**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Constant	-4.138***	-4.134***	-3.508***
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.53)
N	542	483	483
Adjusted R-squared	0.13	0.21	0.20

- Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
- Estimates are derived from a logit model and standard errors are clustered around the targetstate.
- Temporal controls are omitted.

In both Model 1 and 2, *Bad Behavior*'s coefficient estimate is positive, but does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. In other words, the analysis did not reveal any significant differences between targets that pursue an offensive behavior and targets that do not. Therefore, the results do not provide support for Hypothesis 1, the bargaining theory of sanctions recurrence. On the contrary, it suggests that sanctions recurrence cannot be conceptualized as a mere reaction of the sender to the target's offensive behavior in the post-sanctions period. Sanctions research that conceptualizes sanctions episodes as an outcome of the strategic interaction between the sender and the target assumes that the goal of economic sanctions is to alter the behavior of the target by increasing the costs associated with that behavior. However, the results show that target's behavior does not shape the sender's decision to initiate new sanctions.

The domestic theory of sanctions recurrence, on the other hand, is empirically supported. The results suggest that senders' domestic considerations do shape whether they will choose to initiate new economic sanctions in the aftermath of sanctions removal. *Change in Source of Leader Support*'s coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant across all model specifications. Confirming Hypothesis 2(a), the results show that sanctions are more likely to recur if the sender country has a new leader in power in the post-sanctions period and if the new leader is supported by a different social base than the base of its predecessor who ended sanctions. I argue that these new leaders are immune from the domestic costs of sanctions recurrence, such as signaling foreign policy inconsistency and admitting wrong-doing, but on the contrary, they may expect domestic gains from sanctions recurrence by appealing to their political base and special interest groups that incur losses from sanctions removal. The support for the domestic theory of sanctions recurrence is even more visible in Model 3, since the results hold even for the sample restricted to the cases where the target is engaging in an offensive behavior. In these cases, whether there is a change in source of leader support is still a significant determinant of the sender's decision to initiate a new sanctions episode.

Hypothesis 2(b) extends Hypothesis 2(a) by accounting for the sender's domestic consid-

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eration with respect to the state of the economy in the post-sanctions period. I argue that senders are less likely to initiate new sanctions against their targets as their trade volume with the target increases in the aftermath of sanctions removal. The negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates of *Growth of S's Trade with T* in Model 1 and 2 support this expectation. The results suggest that the normalization of economic interactions between the sender and the target can provide leverage to targets in the aftermath of sanctions removal, since the likelihood that they will be punished for future offensive behavior declines as its connectedness with the sender increases. However, the same variable does not have a statistically significant coefficient estimate in Model 3, even if the direction of the estimate remains the same. For the cases where the target is engaging in a security-related offensive behavior, sender's economic considerations does not factor into its decision about sanctions recurrence, but the changes in source of leader support still does. Taken as a whole, the results show that sanctions recurrence is primarily shaped by senders' domestic considerations and does not occur in reaction to targets' offensive behavior in the post-sanctions period.

The results for the control variables included in the models also merit discussion as they can inform our understanding on sanctions recurrence and provide opportunities for future research. In line with the findings of sanctions onset literature, as the foreign policy affinity between the sender and the target increases, the likelihood of sanctions removal diminishes. Moreover, *Frequency of the Dyad*'s positive and statistically significant coefficient indicates that sender-target dyads with a history of economic sanctions are more likely to relapse into renewed sanctions, suggesting path dependency.

The results of *Multilateral* and *Multiple Issues* require further discussion and potentially future research. Initially, I expected to find that multilateral sanctions are harder to re-initiate, assuming that it is hard to maintain the level of support that the initial sanctions had and to convince the coalition members for new sanctions. However, the results provide support for the opposite, and show that multilateral sanctions are more likely to recur than unilateral ones. The coefficient estimate for *Multiple Issues* is negative in all models, and

statistically significant in Model 2 and 3, suggesting that the sanctions that were initially imposed for more than one offensive behavior of the target are less likely to recur. More research is needed to explore the relationship between these two sanction characteristics and sanctions recurrence.

Conclusion

This article explores the conditions under which economic sanctions recur. It presents two competing hypothesis and analyzes whether sanctions recur in response to the policies that the target adopts in the post-sanctions period, or as an outcome of domestic assessments of the sender. The empirical results lend support to the latter theory, the domestic theory of sanctions recurrence.

I find that the sender country is more likely to initiate a new sanctions episode against its target in the aftermath of sanctions removal, if the sources of leader support changes following the termination of sanctions. The causal mechanism I propose is two-fold: First, I argue that sanctions recurrence is costlier for the leaders that gave the decision to end sanctions, or their predecessors that get their power from the same societal base. Initiating a new sanctions episode signals foreign policy inconsistency and admit wrong-doing, which makes sanctions recurrence costly for the leader of the sender country. If, however, the leader of the sender country changes in the post-sanctions period, and the new leader receives its support from a different societal base than its predecessor, sanctions recurrence will not create the same degree of costs. On the contrary, it might generate domestic benefits.

In addition to the findings presented about sanctions recurrence, this study has important implications for future research. It proposes a new avenue of research that integrates the aftermath of sanctions removal into the theories of sanctioning process. There are a number of interesting and policy-relevant questions that can be answered by examining how sender-target relations evolve in the aftermath of sanctions removal. Moreover, this study also has implications for the sanctions effectiveness literature. The question of "when sanctions

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work" is one of the main questions that sanctions scholars investigate. These studies often conceptualize "success" as partial or full acquiescence by the target country to the sender's demands at the time of termination. However, the question about whether sanctions remain to be effective in the long-run is an important question yet to be answered.

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Appendix

This section provides descriptive statistics, presents the results for robustness checks, and provides the list of sanctions episodes coded for the years between 2005-2012 in an effort to increase the temporal scope of my analysis. First, Table S1 presents the full results with the inclusion of temporal variables, following (Carter and Signorino 2010).

Table S1: Logistic Regression

DV: Initiating a New Sanctions Episode	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Bad Behavior	0.302	0.479	
	(0.28)	(0.28)	
Change in Source of Leader Support	0.580*	0.589*	0.995**
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.34)
Growth of S's Trade with T	-0.475**	-0.515**	-0.207
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)
Foreign Policy Affinity	-0.712**	-0.730***	-0.641*
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.28)
Frequency of the Dyad	0.323***	0.327***	0.292***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Multilateral	0.572*	0.521*	0.401
	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.34)
Multiple Issues	-0.409	-0.623*	-0.806*
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.38)
Relative CINC Scores	-0.000*	-0.000	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Target Acquiescence	0.268	0.275	0.024
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.29)
Count of Post-Sanctions Years	-0.211***	-0.180**	-0.227**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Time-Squared	0.012**	0.010**	0.013**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time-Cubed	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-4.138***	-4.134***	-3.508***
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.53)
N	2153	1566	619

- Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
- Estimates are derived from a logit model and standard errors are clustered around the targetstate.

Accounting for the Episodes with No Recorded End Dates

Next, I account for episodes with no recorded end dates. I obtain the main results of the paper using a sample, where the cases with no recorded end dates are accounted for by using TIES dataset's *ongoing as of year* variable. I treat the year after the *ongoing as of year* as the end year and construct post-sanction years for the years following that end date. As a robustness check, I drop the cases with no recorded end dates and re-run the main models.

Table S2: Logistic Regression

DV: Initiating a New Sanctions Episode	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Bad Behavior	0.240	0.418	
	(0.27)	(0.27)	
Change in Source of Leader Support	0.538*	0.534*	0.924**
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.34)
Growth of S's Trade with T	-0.452**	-0.489**	-0.173
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)
Foreign Policy Affinity	-0.612**	-0.619**	-0.493
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.27)
Frequency of the Dyad	0.329***	0.330***	0.307***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Multilateral	0.581*	0.532*	0.467
	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.35)
Multiple Issues	-0.370	-0.583*	-0.766
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.41)
Relative CINC Scores	-0.000*	-0.000*	0.002*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Target Acquiescence	0.289	0.279	0.076
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.34)
Count of Post-Sanctions Years	-0.199**	-0.166*	-0.219**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Time-Squared	0.011**	0.010*	0.013**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time-Cubed	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-4.157***	-4.113***	-3.641***
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.55)
N	2008	1447	564

- Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
- Estimates are derived from a logit model and standard errors are clustered around the targetstate.

Coding Sanctions Recurrence (2006-2012)

There were 85 security-related sanctions that have post-sanctions years after the year 2005, the last year for which the TIES dataset contains information on threats and imposition of economic sanctions. In order to increase the temporal scope of my analysis, I identified instances of sanctions recurrence in the years between 2006-2012, primarily using *Lexis Nexis* and government reports. I identified a total of 22 sanctions episodes that took place in the post-sanctions years of the security-related episodes coded by TIES.

1. **Caseid:** 19770581 **Dyad:** US-Libya **End Year:** 2006

   Sanctions Recurrence: (**2011**) U.S. closed its embassy in Tripoli and imposed sanctions on Libya and froze the American-held assets of Qaddafi, his family, and senior members of the government due to the violent crackdown of citizens.

2. **Caseid:** 1984073101 **Dyad:** US-Iraq **End Year:** 2003

   Sanctions Recurrence: (**2007**) U.S. imposed sanctions on certain individuals, blocking their property and economic transactions, due to their "undermining efforts to promote political reform in Iraq." - Executive Order 13439 of July 17, 2007.

3. **Caseid:** 1989022301 **Dyad:** US-Iran **End Year:** 1998

   Sanctions Recurrence: (**2006**) U.S. imposed sanctions on Iran to prohibit all transactions directly or indirectly involving Bank Sadaret, Iran's largest bank.

4. **Caseid:** 1990080202 **Dyad:** US-Iraq **End Year:** 2002

   Sanctions Recurrence: (**2007**) See the details of the Executive Order 13439 of July 17, 2007 provided for Case 2.

5. **Caseid:** 1990122101 **Dyad:** US-Guatemala **End Year:** 2008

   Sanctions Recurrence: (**2012**) OFAC imposes sanctions on individuals and entities in Guatemala due to their ties with a Guatemalan trafficker and violation of the Kingpin

Act.

6. **Caseid:** 1992031001 **Dyad:** US-Iraq **End Year:** 2002

   <u>Sanctions Recurrence:</u> (**2007**) See the details of the Executive Order 13439 of July 17, 2007 provided for Case 2.

7. **Caseid:** 1992071701 **Dyad:** Russia-Estonia **End Year:** 1997

   <u>Sanctions Recurrence:</u> (**2007**) Russia threatens to impose sanctions on Estonia after the Estonian president provides a legal basis for a possible demolition of the monument to Soviet soldiers in the center of Tallinn.

8. **Caseid:** 1995020801 **Dyad:** US-Lebanon **End Year:** 2000

   <u>Sanctions Recurrence:</u> (**2006**) The U.S. implemented an arms embargo on the export of arms and defense services to Lebanon, in accordance with UNSCR 1701.

9. **Caseid:** 1995030103 **Dyad:** US-Iran **End Year:** 1998

   <u>Sanctions Recurrence:</u> (**2006**) See case 3 for sanctions imposed Bank Sadaret.

10. **Caseid:** 1996032706 **Dyad:** US-Venezuela **End Year:** 2004

    <u>Sanctions Recurrence:</u> (**2006**) The U.S. banned arms sales to Venezuela due to the government's lack of assistance to the U.S. in combating terrorism.

11. **Caseid:** 1999021102 **Dyad:US-Eritrea** US-Venezuela **End Year:** 2000

    <u>Sanctions Recurrence:</u> (**2006**) The U.S. imposes sanctions on Eritrea to improve religious freedoms. Information taken from the GIGA Dataset.

12. **Caseid:** 2000051901 **Dyad:US-Fiji** US-Venezuela **End Year:** 2001

    <u>Sanctions Recurrence:</u> (**2006**) Assistance to Fiji, including military aid, has been suspended by the U.S. following the military takeover.

13. **Caseid:** 2000061405 **Dyad:US-Venezuela** US-Venezuela **End Year:** 2009

    Sanctions Recurrence: (**2011**) The U.S. imposes travel bans on key government officials due to their believed involvement in human rights abuses, acts of public corruption, and involvement in drug trafficking.

14. **Caseid:** 2000061407 **Dyad:US-Fiji** US-Venezuela **End Year:** 2003

    Sanctions Recurrence: (**2006**) See Case 12.

15. **Caseid:** 2000080102 **Dyad:US-Liberia** US-Venezuela **End Year:** 2003

    Sanctions Recurrence: (**2011**) The Chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa threatened Liberia with sanctions, saying that "the US will hold accountable any and all leaders and their supporters seeking to undermine Liberia's peace and democracy by all means, including the use of sanctions.

16. **Caseid:** 2000081601 **Dyad:**US-Mali **End Year:** 2009

    Sanctions Recurrence: (**2012**) Following the military takeover in the country, the U.S. imposed sanctions (travel bans and asset freezes) on the leaders of the coup and their families.

17. **Caseid:** 2001121501 **Dyad:**India-Pakistan **End Year:** 2003

    Sanctions Recurrence: (**2008**) India warned Pakistan that it needed to act fast in the wake of Mumbai terror attacks or else face possible economic sanctions.

18. **Caseid:** 2002020502 **Dyad:**US-Costa Rica **End Year:** 2009

    Sanctions Recurrence: (**2011**) U.S. Department of State downgraded Costa Rica from Tier 2 to the Tier 2 watchlist, designating the country as a source of human sex trafficking and forced labor. The Tier 2 countries are in danger of potential economic sanctions from the U.S.

19. **Caseid:** 2003032401 **Dyad:**US-Pakistan **End Year:** 2005

   Sanctions Recurrence: (**2007**) U.S. imposes sanctions on Pakistan for the country's support to the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe.

20. **Caseid:** 2003071401 **Dyad:**US-Pakistan **End Year:** 2004

   Sanctions Recurrence: (**2009**) The U.S. imposes sanctions against the military leader of Guinea, members of the junta and other individuals that are believed to undermine the restoration of democracy and the rule of law.

21. **Caseid:** 2005031501 **Dyad:**US-Kenya **End Year:** 2009

   Sanctions Recurrence: (**2010**) The U.S. Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes stated that Kenya could face international sanctions over failure to arrest genocide fugitive Felicien Kabuga and sitting on vital information that can fast-track the arrest of Kabuga.

22. **Caseid:** 2005042901 **Dyad:**United Kingdom-Uganda **End Year:** 2007

   Sanctions Recurrence: (**2010**) The head of the UK's official government aid agency has warned Uganda that unless government takes action on corruption, they will withhold aid.